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Introduction
Large and growing public debt in many countries, such as the US, Japan and Eurozone members, is alarming policymakers and citizens. Similarly, ever-increasing sovereign debt at sub-national levels like US states or German federal states as well as at the municipality level is gaining attention. The on-going debt crisis has also spurred an academic debate focusing on the macro-economic and political economic mechanisms that drive sovereign debt. The insolvency of Detroit in 2013 put municipality debt into the spotlight. This paper investigates spatial interdependencies between debts of local jurisdictions.
While the existing spatial econometric literature focuses on tax and spending competition (see section 2), surprisingly, very little is known about spatial interaction via public debt.
Does debt spread from one local jurisdiction to the other?
The theoretical conjecture for positive debt interactions between jurisdictions is the following. Political units that simultaneously compete on taxes and spending can nd it worthwhile to nance current expenditures through debt instead of taxes. In the short run, increasing the level of debt allows a jurisdiction to gain an advantage over others in the competition on today's taxes and expenditures. Our argument is thus linked to the theoretical work by Jensen and Toma (1991) , who show that the level of taxation does not necessarily determine public good provision when debt issuing is allowed. Their model, therefore, highlights the interrelation between spatial tax and spending competition and spatial dependencies in public debt.
Earlier research concludes that spatial tax and spending competition should not be analyzed in isolation (see Allers and Elhorst (2011) and the detailed discussion in section 2). Similar to their argument, we now emphasize that debt is an additional dimension that needs to be considered in order to understand spatial competition if jurisdictions have the discretion to shift the costs of expenditures into the future. As argued by Allers and Elhorst (2011), the understanding of competition is necessarily incomplete if not all decision parameters are considered.
The political economics literature on debt recognizes multiple mechanisms that amend the above argument. First, the decision on taxes, expenditures and debts are typically in the hands of politicians. Inherent in the democratic process, the political decision makers consider a shorter time horizon than the local constituency does, thus, favoring taxes tomorrow, i.e. debt, over taxes today. Second, a large literature on political business cycles illustrates that governments favor high spending and low taxes particularly in times of elections, which all else equal must lead to higher debt (see Nordhaus (1975) , Blais and Nadeau (1992) , Veiga and Veiga (2007) , Foremny and Riedel (2012) ).
1 Third, a literature on the strategic use of debt illustrates that political considerations lead to debt issuing instead of current taxation. Partisan politicians may incur debt instead of levying taxes not only to gain an advantage in tax competition but also to limit the opportunities of later governments (see Alesina and Tabellini (1990) , Fiva and Natvik (2011) ).
2 Finally, also the particular institutional setting in Germany incentivizes municipalities to favor debt over current taxation. While municipalities have constitutionally guaranteed rights to manage their own aairs, they face little to no actual risk of insolvency.
Municipalities (and investors) ultimately expect complete bail out by state governments in case of scal distress, such that German municipalities might see all the more benets to strengthen their position in the tax and spending competition by going into debt.
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In our empirical analysis, we investigate spatial interactions in debts between German municipalities. We focus on municipalities in the two largest states, Bavaria and North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW), mainly during the 1999-2006 time period. Studying the German case is of particular interest as the German municipalities are allowed to incur debts. The fact that all municipalities (within a state) operate within a common institutional framework facilitates the identication of spatial interaction eects isolated from confounding factors, which are often of concern in cross-country studies.
In our main specication, we use a spatial Durbin model in a panel framework (Elhorst (2012) ). Using this model, we present estimates for spatial interactions in debt and also 1 Note that the above arguments raise the question why politicians get away with everincreasing debt. Voters must ultimately realize that the debt needs to be repaid. Existing literature, however, illustrates that voters are indeed myopic. For German municipalities, Freier (2011) shows that mayors face higher chances of reelection if they increase expenditures above average levels. However, voters fail to punish local mayors as public debt is also increased above the average. 2 Another model of strategic debt is developed by Persson and Svensson (1989) . Their mechanism builds on the idea that right and left governments typically dier in the amount of desired spending. Low reelection chances increase the incentives of a conservative government to borrow in order to restrict left governments in the amount of taxation (and spending) in later periods. Empirically, Pettersson-Lidbom (2001) conrms that the strategic rationale for debt is indeed of importance in Swedish municipalities. 3 Limitations to and consequences of municipality debt institutionalized especially in North Rhine-Westphalia are discussed in section 3.
show the eects when we use taxes and spending as outcome variables. To assess the robustness of the results, among other tests, we alternate the spatial weighting matrix, we report results for specication tests and we show that`competition' on debt does not work via subcategories of debt where municipalities have little discretion.
Our results show signicant positive interaction eects between neighboring municipalities. We nd interaction coecients for debt in the order of 0.16-0.33, meaning that an increase in the debt level of the neighboring municipalities by 100 Euro (per capita) increases debt in a municipality by 16 Euro in NRW and by 33 Euro in Bavaria (per capita). The results are signicant in both states under consideration and are robust to various specications of the spatial model. We explore various standard as well as two non-standard spatial weighting matrices, the rst considering the grouping of municipalities into counties, and the second one implementing a theoretical suggestion by Janeba and Osterloh (2013). We also consider dynamic spatial lag models. Our estimates of spatial debt interaction lie in between estimates for tax and spending interaction. The results indeed indicate that local government debt interaction must be regarded as an important dimension of local spatial interaction in addition to tax and spending competition between municipalities.
The remaining analysis is structured as follows: In section 2, we discuss the relevant literature on tax and spending competition. Section 3 delineates the institutional setting in German municipalities and introduces our data. The empirical model and estimation strategy is then described in section 4 before we present and discuss our ndings in section 5. The analysis is concluded in section 6.
Literature on scal competition
The theoretical literature explains horizontal scal interaction between local governments by three dierent approaches: tax or spending competition for a mobile tax base (Wildasin (1988) ), yardstick competition (Salmon (1987)), or spillover eects of public goods (Case, Rosen, and Hines (1993) ). These theories explain spatial interaction between spending or tax setting behavior of municipalities and can be extended to debt interaction, as we argue in the following.
In the tax competition model by Wildasin (1988) , municipalities compete via a tax rate for a mobile capital base. They use the tax revenues to provide a public good. However, each municipality has an incentive to lower the tax rate incrementally to attract more capital and thus a higher tax base. Other jurisdictions will react and lower their tax rates as well. The result is a race to the bottom, where municipalities have ineciently low tax rates, which results in an underprovision of public goods. A rich empirical literature documents the relevance of signicant tax interaction (see, e.g. Ladd (1992 ), Büttner (2001 ), Bordignon, Cerniglia, and Revelli (2003 ), Gerard, Jayet, and Paty (2010 ), and Cassette, Porto, and Foremny (2012 ; for overviews see Brueckner (2003) and Allers and Elhorst (2005) ).
The tax competition approach can also be extended to spending when municipalities compete for a tax base via expenditures that benet private capital (see Keen and Marchand (1997) ) or expenditures that attract qualied workers (see Borck, Caliendo, and Steiner (2007) ). Competition in expenditures will typically result in an overprovision of certain public goods (the good that is nanced with those expenditures). Note that, to the extent that the competition is targeted only to a specic group (capital owners, qualied workers), public goods that are not of interest to this group may again be provided to an ineciently low level. Similar to tax competition, the interaction between expenditures of neighboring jurisdictions is also demonstrated empirically (see, e.g. Case, Rosen, and Hines (1993) , Sole-Olle (2006), and Borck, Caliendo, and Steiner (2007) ; for an overview see Allers and Elhorst (2011)).
As mentioned above, the interplay between expenditure and tax competition is emphasized by Allers and Elhorst (2011). They start from the observation that both taxes and spending are ultimately linked by the same budget constraint. Considering only one of these variables in the analysis ignores the common budget constraint. Using data from municipalities in the Netherlands, they solve this problem by estimating a spatial seemingly unrelated regression model, where the property tax rate and the amount of net spending are dependent variables. 4 Note that the institutional setting in the Netherlands is such that municipalities must reach a balanced budget (and, thus, there are no intertemporal incentives for borrowing).
While Allers and Elhorst (2011) focus on taxes and spending, Jensen and Toma (1991) model tax competition when jurisdiction are free to issue debt. They show in a twoperiod tax competition framework with two jurisdictions that governments can have an 4 Allers and Elhorst (2011) develop a SURE estimator for cross-sectional data. We argue that debt is best studied in a model that uses panel data. 5 incentive to issue debt in the rst period in the presence of tax competition. In their model the direct link between the tax rate and the provision of public goods vanishes when municipalities are allowed to incur debt. To curb the eects of underprovision of public goods in a tax competition environment, jurisdictions issue public debt in the rst period of the model if taxes in the jurisdictions are strategic complements. Because the model requires those debts to be repaid, the underprovision is then more severe in period 2. From Jensen and Toma (1991), we can infer that tax interactions among municipalities also lead to interdependencies in debt. 5 Given the main argument in the model, a similar theoretical argument can be used to link competition on expenditures and debt.
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A second argument for the existence of spatial interactions in scal policy is due to yardstick competition. Here, politicians are politically sensitive to neighboring changes in scal policy. Citizens use some observable characteristics, typically taxes or spending, to judge the performance of their politicians. In anticipation, politicians who underperform in comparison to their neighbors try to mimic these observable characteristics (Salmon (1987) ). The characteristics relevant for yardstick competition are likely to include public debt, although this surprisingly has not received attention in the literature.
The third motivation for government interaction emphasizes direct spillover eects of scal measures. Benets of one local government's expenditures may spill over into neighboring municipalities, for example when roads or theaters built in one municipality are used by residents of neighboring towns. Moreover, local jurisdictions may exhibit similar scal parameters simply for the reason of a common practice. Decision makers for scal policy gain information on desirable levels of taxes or expenditures by observing the activity in neighboring jurisdictions (for expenditure spillovers, see Case, Rosen, and Hines (1993)); the same may apply to debt and lead to similar developments of debt in 5 More specically, Jensen and Toma (1991) show that in their two-period model tax competition will result in lower taxes and more competition in the rst period. As all debt has to be repaid, the model also predicts higher taxes and less intense competition in the second period. We presume that our empirical setting is related more closely to the rst period eects as debt levels are increasing consistently throughout our period of observation. 6 Schultz and Sjöström (2001) present a dierent model of local debt, again with two periods and two districts. Local districts accumulate debt in the rst period to nance a durable public good, because the debt nancing ensures that immigrants arriving in the second period share their part of the burden instead of free riding. Conditional on the level of public goods, an ineciently high level of debt is accumulated because of externalities on the other district due to migration. In a similar model by Schultz and Sjöström (2004) , the median voters in each district prefer shortsighted local politicians who accumulate high debt levels, again due to the migration externality. 6 neighboring municipalities.
Institutional setting, data and descriptives
This section discusses the institutional setting in which German municipalities operate.
Moreover, we introduce the data that we use in the empirical analysis and feature descriptive statistics.
Institutional setting
The municipality level is the lowest and most disaggregated level of the public institutions in Germany.
7 The main areas of local public good provision involve general administration, public order, infrastructure, cultural institutions and public transport. Together with the other government tiers, municipalities also administrate expenditures for child care, schooling and social security. Furthermore, the local level often supervises and administrates basic services such as water and energy supply or waste disposal. To nance those services, municipalities receive income from three own local taxes (two types of property taxes and a tax on local businesses) along with allocated tax revenue from local income taxes and the VAT as well as state-allocated grants. Overall, municipalities have considerable (constitutionally guaranteed) discretion in their budgeting. All decisions on the nances of a municipality are in the hands of an elected mayor and the elected local town council. 8 Importantly for our analysis, municipalities in Germany have the right to incur debts.
Municipal debt makes up about six percent of the overall public debt in Germany 7 Besides the federal level, there are 16 federal states, about 450 counties and a total of about 12,500 municipalities. Following the Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS) developed by the European Union, all German LAU-1 and LAU-2 regions are labeled as municipalities. In addition, we include the independent cities which are NUTS3 regions, but have the same administrative tasks as municipalities. 8 In NRW and Bavaria, voters elect mayors through majoritarian elections and councils through proportional elections. In both states, the local elections for mayor and council are held on a state-wide election date every 5 years in NRW and every 6 years in Bavaria. In our period, elections were held in 1999 and 2004 in NRW and in 2002 in Bavaria. Note that, the responsibilities of the mayors include the operative management of the administration as well as preparation of all decisions that are to be made in the council. Also, the mayor has active voting rights in the council and often heads the dierent spending committees of the council. Ultimately, the legislative body that makes the nal decisions on all municipal aairs is the town council.
throughout our observation period. The prime lenders to German municipalities are German savings and loan associations (Sparkassen ), German private banks as well as state run public banks (Freier and Grass (2013) ). While municipalities are generally free to incur debt, the federal state authorities have extensive formal oversight rights on local borrowing. Regulations dier between the 16 federal states of Germany. In the two federal states we analyze, Bavaria and North Rhine Westphalia (NRW), municipalities must seek approval when they intend to borrow for larger infrastructure investments (such debt is part of our core debt data). Municipalities can also incur short-term debt for current expenditures (Kassenverstärkungskredite ), which does not require formal approval of the state government in either of the two states under study during our observation period.
Municipalities that, left alone, would suer from insolvency, loose active steering rights in their municipal nances, resulting in state regulators taking over local decision making.
The actual procedure is organized in dierent steps ranging from more oversight when the nancial situation becomes critical to complete take-over when insolvency would be reached. Specically, in 1991, the state of NRW implemented a concept in its municipal code that mandates municipalities in nancial distress to present a budget consolidation plan (Haushaltssicherungskonzept ) to the regulating authority. The plan is approved if it shows how a balanced budget can be reached within three years.
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The current institutional setting in Germany implicitly guarantees that the federal states stand in for public debt incurred by their municipalities. Investors are guaranteed full compensation with states bailing out local authorities. As a result, we do not see interest rate spreads as a function of the economic conditions of a municipality (see Ade (2011)) .
Given this institutional design, incentives to incur debt to gain an advantage in tax and spending competition are increased.
The two states in our analysis are NRW and Bavaria. There are multiple reasons why we focus on those states in particular. First, they represent two of the biggest states both 9 In 2011 this time frame was extended to ten years. If the budget consolidation plan is not approved, the municipality is in the state of an emergency budget (Art. 82 Municipality Code NRW). In this case, only expenditures are permitted that are mandated by law or that continue necessary tasks and cannot be postponed. Conversion of debt is permitted, but credit necessary to continue investments already begun must be approved by the regulating authority. Tax rates of local taxes must stay at the last year's level. If the municipality keeps on failing to present an approvable consolidation plan, the regulating authority can limit the municipality's administrative autonomy and order saving measures or even impose them. In 2011, after our period of analysis, the state of NRW started a large active program to limit municipal debt (NRW Stärkungspakt). 8 in terms of population as well as size.
10 Together, about 37% of Germany's population resides in one of these two states. Data on municipal nances can be obtained for both states and can also be linked to relevant background information. Generally, the specic tasks and responsibilities of the municipal level in Germany dier by state, which makes state comparisons complicated. The two states in our sample, however, each put a relatively large share of the overall responsibilities in a state at the discretion of their municipalities.
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While our two states are similar in importance and the institution setup, there are also interesting dierences. Municipalities in NRW are generally large, relatively urban and industrial. Moreover, the level of debt is comparatively high. In Bavaria, the structure is dierent in that there are many small to medium-sized towns, which are often rather rural and agricultural. Moreover, the overall level of debt is much lower in Bavaria than in NRW. 12
Data and descriptive statistics
We use data from a complete panel of municipalities in the German federal states of North Rhine-Westphalia and Bavaria from 1999 until 2006.
13 In Bavaria, we observe data for all 2,056 municipalities, and in NRW, for all 396 municipalities, in each cross-section.
For both states and all years, we combine the ocial statistics on the municipal level on scal variables (debt, taxes and expenditures), population data (number of inhabitants, 10 In 2013, NRW had a population of 17.85 million inhabitants on an area of about 34,000 km 2 and is the largest German state in terms of population. Bavaria had a population of 12.67 million people (2nd largest state) and a size of about 70,500 km 2 making it the largest state in terms of area. 11 In 2005, 50.7 percent of all state and municipal expenditures in NRW were under the control of the municipalities. The share in Bavaria was almost as high, at 47.1 %, as well. While few other states have similarly high numbers (e.g. Hesse and Baden-Württemberg), other states have a considerably lower level of local activity (East German states reach on average 44.2 %, Saarland has the lowest numbers with only 36.5 %.), see Böttcher, Junkernheinrich, and Micosatt (2010), p. 107. Importantly, states such as Rhineland-Palatinate and Lower Saxony would be even more complicated to compare, because local activity there involves an additional tier of government (Amt) between municipalities and counties. Moreover, states in the East can often not be compared over time as the municipal structures have seen important changes in administrative reforms.
structure of the population, information on unemployment) and regional data on local GDP (on the county level). The data are provided by the Research Data Centers of the Federal and State Statistical Oces.
Descriptive statistics for all variables used in the analysis (pooled for all years and by state) are found in Table A .1 in Appendix A. Notably, NRW has much larger municipalities in terms of population, higher average per capita debt and higher unemployment rates than Bavaria. Per capita net spending (the sum of all expenditures net of obligations due to the scal equalization system) is somewhat higher in NRW than in Bavaria in terms of mean and median. Looking at particular spending categories, municipalities in NRW exhibit larger current operating and personnel expenditures and much higher levels of welfare spending.
14 The age structures of the population in both federal states, as indicated by the shares of persons below 15 and above 65 years of age, are similar.
Net migration is dened as population inow minus outow, normalized by the number of inhabitants, and is a bit larger on average in Bavaria. We further collected the real growth rate in GDP at the county level (total value added, in domestic prices, deated by the federal state consumer price index).
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As our main outcome variable in the empirical model, we use the per capita debt of a municipality. The data allow for a distinction between accumulated per capita debt of the core budget (Kernhaushalt ), short term debt (Kassenverstärkungskredite ) and debt of a municipality's public companies. In our basic models we use the sum of the core budget and the short term debt, because these are under direct control of the municipality. In further estimations, we will also analyze all three types of debt separately. As additional descriptive information, we collected data about the maturity and the lender structure of the core budget debt. Concerning the maturity of debt, both federal states show a similar structure. Regarding the structure of the lenders, Bavarian municipalities do not use loans from state public banks (Landesbanken ) as extensively as municipalities in NRW.
14 Bavaria includes some strong spending outliers. Most outliers with high values of per capita net spending are attributed to the municipality of Unterföhring. This municipality, which is located just outside Munich, is indeed special in that it is an exceptionally attractive business location. Among the many rms residing in that municipality are public and private media companies as well as big insurance companies such as Allianz and Swiss Re. 15 Unfortunately, data on local GDP is not available on the level of each individual municipality. Instead, we use county level growth rates for all municipalities from a county. Note that for large urban municipalities (kreisfreie Städte) the municipal and the county level coincide, thus, they have individual GDP growth rates.
In addition to public debt, we examine per capita net spending and rates of the local independent taxes as dependent variables. With regard to taxes, we explore the property tax rates A and B 16 as well as the local business tax rate. All aforementioned taxes have in common that municipalities choose multipliers (labeled tax rates in Table A .1) that are applied to a uniform basic tax.
17 Since 2004 the tax rate multiplier for the local business tax must range between 200 and 800.
18
The spatial distribution of per capita debt is depicted in Figure B .1 for NRW and Figure   B 4 Empirical model and strategy
The goal of this paper is to estimate the extent of spatial dependency of debt between German municipalities. To this end, we need to incorporate debt in a spatial panel framework. As a starting point, the simplest specication of this approach incorporates the neighboring debt into a regression framework (Spatial Lag Model -SLM):
16 Property tax A is used for agricultural and property tax B for all other real estate. The tax bases shown in Table A .1 indicate that the property tax B is relatively more important. 17 The eective local business tax rate in 2009 is calculated as 0.035 * multiplier, for example; see Bach and Fossen (2008) for details. 18 No municipalities in NRW or Bavaria were directly aected by this restriction, as indicated by the minimum and maximum values of the local business tax multiplier in the period 1999-2006. 19 The jumps in the tax rates in NRW in 2003 are likely to be related to an increase in the standardized tax multipliers (ktive Hebesätze) in that year, which are set by the state government and are used in the local scal equalization scheme (see Baskaran (2013), for details). As the adjustment of these standardized tax multipliers is the same for all municipalities in NRW, this is accounted for in our estimations by the time xed eects.
where y it denotes per capita debt of municipality i at time t (i = 1, . . . , N ; t = 1999, 2000, . . . , 2006) . According to our argumentation, municipalities will be aected by the debt of a predened set of neighbors. This is described by the term w ij y jt , where w ij is the i,jth element of a nonnegative N × N weighting matrix, W , which assigns neighboring municipalities. By assumption, a municipality cannot be a neighbor with itself and therefore the main diagonal of W equals zero. The response to neighboring municipalities is captured in the estimation parameter λ. The term x it is a 1 × K vector of socio-demographic variables from municipality i at time t (in further specications, we will additionally include structural characteristics) and β is a related K × 1 vector of estimation parameters. Furthermore, it represents a normal, independent and identically distributed error term. 20 µ i and ζ t label municipality and time xed eects (FE), respectively.
The inclusion of spatially lagged independent variables leads to the Spatial Durbin Model (SDM):
where w ij x jt represents the characteristics of neighboring municipalities and θ denotes the corresponding K × 1 vector of their respective parameters.
In order to nd the most adequate spatial specication, we conduct various LM and LR tests along the lines of Elhorst (2012). The test results guide us to choose the SDM over the SLM. 21 20 One might argue that the assumption of normal distributed error terms for Maximum Likelihood is strong and that estimates in practice may therefore be inconsistent. However, Lee (2004) shows that without the assumption of the normal distribution of the residuals, the resulting Quasi-Maximum Likelihood estimator is asymptotically consistent. These results apply here because our sample is suciently large. 21 The test statistics can be reviewed in Table A .2 in the Appendix. We also tested the Spatial Durbin Model against the Spatial Error Model (SEM) in which the spatial dependency is modeled through the residuals. Our test results speak in favor of the SDM here, too. Also note that the The panel structure of the data allow us to exclude time and municipality xed eects by a double de-meaning procedure. Thus, we identify our models from changes in the per capita debt variable within a municipality over time. As the current local government takes the level of debt from last year as given, we interpret changes in debt as the actual decision parameters for municipal politicians.
The estimations of eq. (2) are conducted in Matlab by using routines provided by Elhorst (2012). 22 These routines estimate the model via (Quasi) Maximum Likelihood and allow us to apply the bias correction that has been proposed by Lee and Yu (2010a).
23
To nd the spatial weighting matrix W that ts the data best, we subsequently estimate the baseline SDM in (2) using various matrices suggested by the literature: binary contiguity matrices of rst and second order, row normalized matrices where all municipalities within a certain radius around the municipality centroid are assigned as neighbors, and Inverse Distance Matrices with dierent cut-o radii with row and eigenvalue normalization. Following Elhorst (2010), we compare the log likelihood values of the models using the dierent weighting matrices. For both federal states, the models employing Inverse Distance Matrices with row normalization perform best among the aforementioned matrices. In NRW, the Inverse Distance Matrix with a cut-o after 15km results in the highest log likelihood value, and for Bavaria, the best cut-o radius is 20km (see Table   A .3 in Appendix A). 24 Therefore, in our main specications we will use these weighting matrices to incorporate geographical interaction. Row normalizing an Inverse Distance Matrix implies that the distance loses its cardinal interpretation. While the exact distance is relevant in the context of transportation costs, for example, in our context of scal interaction between municipalities it is the relative distance to neighboring munici-SDM is a generalization of the SEM and it therefore produces correct standard errors of the coecient estimates even when the true model has spatial autocorrelation (see Elhorst (2010) Lee and Yu (2010a) show that due to the incidental parameter problem, the estimation of a model that includes both a spatial lag and spatial residuals may be inconsistent. They derive a bias correction that allows for consistent estimation. Elhorst (2012) adopts their approach and translates their bias correction to the SAR, SER and SDM models. Due to our relatively large sample size of 396 and 2,056 observations in the cross section, we expect the bias correction to mainly aect the standard errors but not the parameter estimates (see equation (8) in Elhorst (2012)). 24 We could not use a cut-o after 10km, since some large municipalities in NRW would have no neighbors in this case. As a cut-o after 14km leads to a smaller log likelihood, the cut-o after 15km seems to be at least a local maximum.
palities in comparison to other neighbors that is decisive, a feature well captured by row normalization. 25 In the robustness section, we will further highlight that our estimates are robust with respect to alternative weighting matrices. We will also present results for non-standard geographical weighting matrices.
As the dependent variable, we use the sum of the core budget and short term debt, as previously noted. The choice of independent variables in our benchmark specication follows the tax and spending interaction literature. We include the population size and its square plus the population structure, i.e. the shares of persons below 15 years and above 65 years of age, as indicators of the work force available in the municipality and the dependency rate. In addition, the number of unemployed persons per 100 inhabitants is included, capturing the impact of economic shocks on municipalities. In the SDM all these explanatory variables enter in levels as well as spatial lags.
In an extended model, we employ additional control variables. First, we include per capita expenditures on personnel and current operating expenditures. Municipalities have limited control over these expenditure categories, at least in the short run. Including these controls in the regression helps to identify the amount of spatial debt interaction due to deliberate decisions of local governments. Similar considerations lead to the inclusion of spending on social needs in the model. This control might be important because a reform of unemployment insurance and social assistance in Germany in 2004 (Hartz IV reform) shifted the costs of social assistance to the local level, which aected municipalities dierently depending on the number of inhabitants eligible for benets.
We consider social spending exogenous at the municipal level because municipalities have to follow regulations set at the federal level and have very little discretion over these kinds of expenditures. Moreover, we add measures of the municipality's revenues as controls, i.e. the rst time lag of the tax bases (Grundbetrag ) both from the local business tax and the two local property taxes. We also control for county GDP growth because the ability to issue debt might be inuenced by regional business cycle eects (on top of country-wide year eects that we capture with time xed eects). Finally, we include per capita net migration because this exerts a mechanical eect on our per capita debt measures.
25 Consider an example where municipality A has two neighbors at distances of 2km and 4km and municipality B has three neighbors at distances of 2, 4 and 6 km. By normalizing the row sums to one, the neighbor at 2km distance has a stronger inuence on municipality A than on B, which is what one would expect given the inuence of the third neighbor on B.
5 Results
In this section, we rst present our main results for the spatial interaction in public debt. Then, we compare the ndings to estimation results for taxation and expenditure interaction in the same data. In the third subsection, we compare the spatial interaction in dierent types of debt, before providing a number of robustness checks, including dynamic spatial lag models, in the nal two subsections.
Main results
Concerning the basic specication of our model, we refer to Table 1 . Column (1) presents the basic model as outlined in equation (2) for NRW and column (3) the same model for Bavaria. Throughout this section, we will refer to these results as our benchmark. We This justies the use of the Spatial Durbin Model.
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Our estimates for λ are robust to the inclusion of additional control variables. We include operating and personnel expenditures, welfare spending, the local tax bases, as well as county-level GDP growth and net migration ow (see columns (2) and (4) of Table 1 for NRW and Bavaria, respectively). LR-tests (reported in the bottom of Table 1) indicate that these additional controls and their spatial lags are jointly signicant.
As outlined in section 3.1, the results for NRW and Bavaria allow for an interesting comparison. Despite the relatively large dierences in municipal size, the economic structure 26 In addition, we show that the application of the SDM largely removes the spatial autocorrelation among the residuals. To test this, we extract the SDM residuals and calculate Moran's I statistic for each of the eight cross sections in the two federal states. The spatial autocorrelation among the residuals of the SDM is found to be close to zero: The Moran's I statistics range from -0.07 to 0.04 in NRW and from -0.018 to 0.008 in Bavaria, and they are statistically dierent from zero at the 10% level in only four out of the 16 estimations. Full results are available from the authors on request. for NRW (Bavaria). Standard errors in parentheses: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 Source:
Own calculations. and particularly the debt level, the results for the estimated interaction eects are positive and highly signicant in both federal states. The fact that the independent results point into a similar direction for both states highlights that the evidence is not conned to only one particular sample. However, the fact that the eects are smaller in NRW may highlight that the degree of interaction is potentially limited when municipalities face constraints. In particular, the high debt level in many municipalities in NRW may restrict them in incurring additional debt in response to their neighbors' policies.
Comparison between spending, taxes and debt
This section compares the spatial interaction eects of debt, spending, and the three dierent tax rate multipliers. In order to keep the results comparable, we will use the same independent variables from the benchmark model and only change the dependent variable. This comparison is conducted in Table 2 . Column (1) repeats the results from the benchmark specication with per capita debt as the dependent variable. Table 2 now allows for the comparison of the spatial debt interaction eect with the interaction eects of net spending amounts (column (2)), the local business tax rate multiplier (column (3)) and the two property tax rate multipliers (columns (4) and (5)).
The results show a relatively large interaction eect among the local business tax rates of 0.290 (0.472) for NRW (Bavaria). Thus, a municipality in NRW will increase its multiplier by 0.290 basis points if its neighboring municipalities increase theirs by one basis point. Similarly for the non-agricultural property tax B, we nd an eect of 0.389 (0.343) for NRW (Bavaria). In comparison, the spatial interaction between net spending is rather low with an eect of 0.098 (0.156) for NRW (Bavaria): A municipality in NRW will increase its expenditure by 9.8 Euro if its neighbors increase spending by 100 Euro.
All these coecients are signicant at the one percent level. 27
This comparison is interesting for at least two reasons. First, we highlight that using the same set of municipalities, the same control variables and the identical spatial econometric approach, we can show spatial interdependence between German municipalities not only in debt, but also in taxes and spending. Second, the estimated interaction eect for debt lies in between the smaller eect for spending and the larger eect for tax rates in both states, which may give an indication that higher debt is indeed used to compete more ercely in taxes, while adapting expenditures to a smaller extend. Overall, we believe that our results correspond nicely with the predictions given by Jensen and Toma (1991) , where (in the rst period of their model), jurisdiction interact strongly in debts to gain an advantage in the tax competition. 
Spatial interactions in dierent types of debt
So far, we show that spatial correlation via debt indeed exists among German municipalities. In this section, we will analyze dierent types of debt to explore in more detail where the interaction takes place. First, we will separate the municipality per capita debt used in the main analysis into the core budget and the short term debt and re-estimate our benchmark model using these debt components. Particularly in NRW, it is likely that municipalities interact with their debt mainly through short term debt, as those debts are less strictly regulated and remain available even when the core budget is in distress. Then, we will repeat our analysis for debt issued by local public companies and the sum of all three debt categories.
Descriptive results from dividing the per capita debt into the regular core budget and short term debt are depicted in Figure B .5 in Appendix B. The graphs demonstrate that municipalities in NRW have increasingly gone into short term debt in our observation period, whereas Bavarian municipalities use this form of debt far less extensively (note the dierent scales). This is also conrmed when looking at the share of municipalities using short term debt as shown in Figure B .6 in Appendix B. The share of municipalities using short term debt in Bavaria is rather stable around ten percent. In contrast, the share in NRW increases monotonically from about twenty percent in 1998 to 50 percent in 2006.
Debt of local public companies is substantive in NRW (see Notes: All models are estimated using the maximum likelihood method and are bias corrected.
The same control variables as in Table 2 are The results for the subcategories of debt appear in Table 3 . The results considering the core budget, the short term debt and the debt of public companies as dependent variables are presented in columns (1), (2), and (3). Estimations using the sum of all three types of debt are reported in column (4). In NRW we observe that the interaction among the core budget debt is not signicant, while the interaction among short term debt is larger than when the sum is considered in the benchmark model. This indicates that municipalities in NRW interact via their short term debt. This can be explained with the institutional setting and debt situation in NRW. As debt levels are generally high, and the core budget (here in particular investment spending) is under state regulation, the limits in this type of debt seem to be exhausted. Instead, municipalities seem to turn to short term debt, in which no institutional boundaries exist (in our observation period) to limit further debt issuing. The interaction close to zero for public company debt (although statistically signicant at the 10 % level) shows that municipalities do not (or cannot) use this kind of debt as an instrument to nance interaction.
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Regarding the interaction in Bavaria, the eect does not change much when comparing the full per capita debt to the debt in the core budget. The interaction among the short term debts is smaller; as mentioned before, only about 10 % of the observations in Bavaria exhibit any positive short term debt. As in NRW, we detect a small negative spatial interaction between public company debt, which here is insignicant. Generally, we conclude that spatial interaction in Bavaria is mainly through core budget debt, which is reasonable as debt levels in Bavarian municipalities are low, and one would not expect constraints in adapting the core debt.
In both states, the estimated magnitude of debt interaction remains similar as in the benchmark estimations when we consider the sum of all three types of debt. Thus, the estimates are robust to the inclusion of public company debt. We prefer the benchmark model without public company debt because these are typically not under full control of municipal governments, as mentioned before.
As noted, the municipalities in NRW do not have as much nancial leeway as their Bavarian counterparts. For a shortened panel from 2002 until 2006, we obtained data on whether an individual municipality in NRW was required to present a budget consolidation plan to the regulating state authorities because of the inability to balance the budget (see section 3.1). 28.24% of the observations in NRW fall under this nancial supervision status at least once in this period. To investigate spatial interactions, we interpret the presence of a budget consolidation plan as an indicator of having reached a ceiling for debt and estimate a linear model using this indicator as a binary dependent variable. We include the explanatory variables from our benchmark model, as well as the per capita debt in the core budget and in the short term.
Corresponding to our results above, we nd spatial correlation (λ = 0.063, SE = 0.037) in the probability of reaching the debt ceiling (in this sense) which is signicant at the ten percent level. This coecient implies that the likelihood of running into a situation that requires a municipality to presenting a budget consolidation plan to the state authorities 28 The fact that we nd zero eects in the core budget and close to zero for the debt in public companies highlights that our main nding of positive debt spillovers in the benchmark model reects economically meaningful interaction and not some pure mechanical eect that would show up in any dependent variables. 20 increases by 6 percentage points if its neighbors are in this situation. Given the baseline probability, we consider this to be a fairly large eect, which highlights that we might indeed be observing a race to the debt trap in NRW.
Robustness checks
We conduct several robustness checks for the main specication with public debts. Table   4 provides the results, where row (1) presents the benchmark results for comparison.
First, in line (2) we extend the panel by additionally including 1998. 29 In row (3), we use the rst lag instead of contemporaneous independent variables, and in row (4), we add a trend instead of year xed eects. None of these variations changes the estimated spatial interaction eect of debt signicantly. The estimated coecients in row (5) do not change much either when we omit the bias correction described in section 4. However, it is worth noting that without the bias correction, we would overestimate the signicance of the interaction eect in Bavaria (corresponding t-value of 19.4 instead of 14.9).
In addition, one might wonder whether the interaction along the boundaries of the federal states to other federal states in Germany or to other countries might dier. There may be little or no interaction across the borders to other countries; Cassette, Porto, and Foremny (2012) show that no tax competition exists between French and German municipalities along the Rhine Valley. On the other hand, Geys and Osterloh (2013) nd that municipalities near a subnational or international border perceive stronger competitive pressure from across the border in the struggle to attract rms. In our framework, structural dierences between municipalities at a border and other municipalities should be captured by the municipality xed eects. To investigate whether border municipalities inuence our results, in specication (6), we remove municipalities that share a border with another federal state or another country, and nd similar spatial interaction eects as in the benchmark model.
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In the estimations reported so far, we account for municipal and time xed eects. As these unobserved eects are likely to be correlated with the dependent and independent variables, an estimation not accounting for these xed eects is likely to be biased. In row (7), we nevertheless report such estimates for comparison. We observe an increase in the 29 We do not include 1998 in our benchmark specication because we use lagged independent variables in various robustness checks of the model. 30 The number of cross section units decreased from 396 to 291 in NRW and from 2,056 to 1,776 in Bavaria. point estimates of the interaction coecient both for Bavaria and NRW, which indicates that these estimates of the spatial interaction eect are biased upwards. The analysis of spatial interactions based on cross-sectional data, where time and unit xed eects cannot be controlled for, must thus be regarded with caution. The spatial interaction eects in this model without xed eects are identied not only by changes in debt over time, but also by debt level dierences between municipalities.
As a placebo test, row (8) shows the results of using a random spatial weighting matrix instead of the matrix capturing the actual spatial distribution of the municipalities. This idea is similar to tests conducted by Case, Rosen, and Hines (1993) and Geys (2006), who construct a placebo weighting matrix based on an alphabetical order. For our experiment, we generate a row normalized radii weighting matrix with a cut-o after 15 (20) km for NRW (Bavaria) as in the benchmark model, but with randomly assigned neighbors. To generate the number of random neighbors for each municipality, we take the mean and standard deviation of the number of neighboring municipalities from the real geographical distribution and draw from a normal distribution with corresponding rst and second moments. Reassuringly, the results using the placebo random weighting matrix do not show any signicant interaction eects. We also assess the robustness of our results with respect to the denition of neighboring municipalities by estimating the benchmark model with dierent specications of the 22 spatial weighting matrix. In section 4, we note that we tested the standard matrices used in the literature to choose the matrix that best ts the data for our benchmark model, as indicated by the highest log likelihood value. We considered binary contiguity matrices, matrices assigning all municipalities within a certain radius as neighbors, and
Inverse Distance Matrices with row or eigenvalue normalization. We identied Inverse
Distance Matrices with row normalization and a cut-o radius of 15 and 20 km as the best weighting matrices for NRW and Bavaria, respectively. In addition, we construct non-standard geographical weighting matrices, which reect the particular institutional setting of municipalities in Germany, and use them to re-estimate our benchmark model. The rst matrix, which we refer to as county matrix, codes all municipalities within a particular county as neighbors. 2,031 of the 2,056 municipalities in Bavaria belong to 71 counties, the remaining 25 municipalities are independent cities;
in NRW, 373 of the 396 municipalities belong to 30 counties, and 23 are independent cities (here we include Aachen, which is partly independent). We assign all independent cities (which are independent from counties) within each federal state as neighbors to each other, as their similarity makes them likely to interact more with one another. The idea behind this weighting matrix is that mayors from municipalities within a county have regular institutional exchange in party meetings or county events. It is likely that these meetings intensify information spillovers and may directly or indirectly aect the decisions of politicians to incur debt.
As the second non-standard spatial weights, we constructed weighting matrices inspired by the theoretical work by Janeba and Osterloh (2013) . They argue that urban centers compete with other centers as well as with their surrounding municipalities while smaller municipalities only compete locally. We implement this approach by assigning all large municipalities with a population above a certain threshold (30k, 50k) in 1998 as neighbors. In addition, they are neighbors as well with their surrounding municipalities within a radius of 20km from their centroid. All other municipalities exclusively regard 23 municipalities within a radius of 20km as their neighbors.
The results for these novel matrices also indicate positive and signicant spatial debt interaction in both states. The point estimates obtained from using the matrices suggested by Janeba and Osterloh (2013) 
In (3), τ denotes the coecient of the rst time lag and η the coecient of the rst time lag of the spatial autoregressive coecient. This specication does not only allow us to control for possible path dependency of debt, furthermore it allows to determine whether the spatial process occurs simultaneously or with a time lag. 32 To account for the occurring bias due to the dynamic part of the model, Lee and Yu (2010c) use asymptotic theory to derive a bias correction, which is incorporated in their estimator.
33 31 We nevertheless decide to use the Inverse Distance Matrix in our benchmark model to facilitate comparisons with the literature. It also leads to the smaller, more conservative point estimate. 32 The estimation routines for the dynamic QML estimator including the dynamic bias correction can be found at http://www.regroningen.nl/elhorst/software.shtml. 33 For a detailed description of the bias correction of the dynamic part, see equation (17) (2013) . The condition for stability is τ + ω max−1 (λ + η) < 1 now, where ω max−1 denotes the second largest eigenvalue of W which is unequal to one.
We estimate (3) using the estimator suggested in Lee and Yu (2010c) and the SFD model using the estimator proposed in Yu, de Jong, and Lee (2008) . Due to the fact that T is rather small in our panels, we additionally consider a dynamic model in a GMM framework as proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) .
This estimator also allows us to include the spatial lag and the time lag and can be used for a comparison with the aforementioned QML estimators.
The results from the dynamic specications appear in Table 5 . Columns (1) and (4) apply equation (3) and column (2) and (5) the SFD model for NRW and Bavaria, respectively.
We obtain estimates for the coecients of the time lag of per capita debt that are signicantly larger than zero in both states; the point estimate is even larger than one in NRW, indicating exploding debt in the observation period. Importantly, the spatial interaction eect λ remains positive and highly signicant in the dynamic estimations.
Moreover, we nd that the spatial interaction eect occurs simultaneously, because the rst lag of the spatial interaction eect is not signicantly dierent from zero. This indicates that a time lag of spatial interaction can safely be removed from the model. The results indicate instability of the debt process, especially in NRW, even when estimating the SFD model.
In columns (3) and (6), we employ a dynamic SAR model within a GMM framework as proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998 w ij y jt−1 , because separate identication of λ and η by GMM is weak due to the similarity of these terms and their instruments. The omission should not bias the estimation because the QML results indicate that η is insignicant. indicates that the estimated GMM is feasible. Again we observe a positive and signicant inuence of the rst time lag of debt and positive and signicant spatial debt interaction, as in the QML estimations, which highlights that the results are not very sensitive to the choice of estimator. Since the dynamic estimates may suer from the relatively small number of time periods in our samples, we abstain from overinterpreting the dynamic eects and take from the estimation of the dynamic models that the spatial interaction eects of debt we are interested in are robust and seem to occur simultaneously, which increases condence in our benchmark model.
6 Conclusion
We provide evidence for spatial interdependence between municipality debt in Germany.
Our spatial econometric estimates are based on municipality panel data from the two federal states of NRW and Bavaria and take into account municipality and time xed eects. The results suggest that a municipality increases its per capita debt by 16 Euro A Appendix -Tables Notes: The dependent variable is the sum of debt from the core budget and short term debt of a municipality, λ denotes the spatial interaction eect. All models are estimated using the bias corrected maximum likelihood method. Independent variables in all specications are: population, population 2 , share of young people, share of old people and unemployed per 100 inhabitants. The averaged neighboring equivalents are included as well as independent variables. The specication of W is described in each row. 
Standard errors in parentheses

